King Bond Market Long $TLT, Bear Oil Fossil Fools and thus almost every sector ETF, selling a put of 5G companies
From the $BLK DD guy that rolled into $XLF last month. I am currently long $SLV, $GLD, $GDX, and $GDXJ with call spreads, shares, and just pruned $AMZN and $AAPL gains but keeping $ARKF, $ARKQ, and $ARKK (ETFs with $TSLA as the largest holding.) Today, Friday's CNBC "Options Action" has just dangled calls on the $TLT, the ETF that tracks the 20+ year *BOND PRICES move inverse to yields and the Fed would not mind rates to hit 0% to spark inflation.* I concur with CNBC who suggested buying August dated call spreads on $TLT. My $XLE long dated puts have been melting up. I am short every sector ETF but $IBB and $XLV. Be careful as these options are not as liquid as the $QQQ or $SPY but I cannot help that sectors are moving down when oil is down. The VIX is holding steady, steady high. I am not hedging with the $VIX when stay home stonks work- the $VIX is broken imao so use $GLD, $SLV, and $TLT because bond rates are going to 0% (meaning the price goes up.) I also concur with CNBC that options are the best way to play a market by reducing risk like selling a put. There are risky options, and very safe options if you can own 100 shares (the company could be $DTEGY Deutsche Telekom AKA T-Mobile/Sprint and the bringer of 5G eventually, pick your poison.) I suggest selling a put for some good companies with solid balance sheets, 5G capabilities, and anything auto in the green space to get 100 shares of companies (see the next paragraph.) My suggestions for getting 100 shares at a cheaper price would be Ericsson (trading under $10,) Dell or VMWare (you pick the one that matches your risk,) NIO (trading below $10), $NOK at $4 is interesting, and for big rollers Amazon (if you have the $ to own 100 shares at $2,500 or $250,000 or less, I would but that is for wsb) That is, if Amazon retests $2,500. I suggest 100 shares of $SHLL for YOLO if this bores you as this is the best $SPAC (but there is probably other ones because management is all you have with blank check companies.) AFTER you own 100 shares of $AAL or $TSM or Dell or whatever, you can dump the 100 shares anytime. I suggest you keep them and sell options and join the theta gang. Why not get paid for owning your 100 shares of $TSM [Taiwan Semiconductor, the company onshoring manufacturing to America] you got at $45? $TSM August 21 $45p is $.35. If you had 100 shares of $TSM today, selling a $60c gives you $140 just for holding the shares until August 21st. Bullish on onshoring green jobs because Trump leaving office is the biggest buy after the news ever. (Buy on the rumor sell on the news but in reverse because solar employs more than fossil fools in TX pre COVIDcession.) For examples of selling a put: $AAL Nov 20th $2 puts are $0.14 (You are agreeing to buy 100 shares of $AAL at $2/share before or on November 20th, if you are not asked to buy $AAL you keep your $0.14 collateral and the full $14 credit.) A shorter dated long put $AAL Aug 21st put is $0.09 ($9.) Or you could buy the death puts on $AAL but JPow exists, hence zombie companies, like Hertz, so that is just blowing money. $AAL has the highest %age interest on their debt and the CLOs (their bond insurance) were the highest, I have to check again ($AAL is the worst, but not as bad as $HTZ, a worthless zombie stock.) *BOND prices move inverse to yields so going from 0.5% to 0% makes the price go up* Zombie companies with balance sheet nightmares is what keeps bond prices upper bound at 0.8 but lower bound is 0%. Worthless zombie stocks include banks, fossil fools, and then by default industrials, and I hate to say that I am only long $XLK and thinking of $IBB. Every day that oil is not above $35 or in the green or both is a day stonks tank. Every stonk will fall after earnings. Short individual stonks going into earnings, wait- all stonks have cancelled earnings. See why I think maximum protection by not going long the VIX but long gold, silver, even transition phase metals, copper, and BONDS. $NEM, $GLDI, $SLVP, $HL, $SAND, $SA, $GLTR, $PALL, $SPPP, $SSRM, $BTG , $PPLT, $PLTM, $NUGT, $BAR, $FNV all up today [I also have $GLNCY, $SBSW, and $PLG.] Why own these when you can just long $GDX and $GDXJ? I do think rates will remain positive, until they are not positive anymore, AKA Japan and Europe :). What BOND fund would you long or short and why, besides $TLT? If a 100 year bond comes out, the interest rate will be 0% anyways in the long run, but we are dead in the long run, so long live bonds until we decarbonize the economy, tax the rich, and pigs fly (not happening fast enough.) Ray Dalio and many others have been harping about this, and a broken clock is right twice a day, or a bear is right when we are in a bear market with a broken VIX. The bond market is king compared to the stonk market in sheer $. And ForEx trades trillions a day and is important (on days the $DXY, the basket of the dollar versus the globe) goes up $GLD should ease and is a time to buy the dip, and on days the $DXY goes down $GLD will gap up during this "bear oil/hospitality/planes" market.) When the $DXY goes down, it takes more dollars to buy the gold/silvecoppematerials, and $GLD rises and is very liquid for options. Thinking August to add to my Dec 31st $160c. That is, unless we are going to allow millions to go into poverty, so then just buy guns and physical gold and we can trade scraps of silver. Fossil fools, the slow pace of massive renewable energy projects, and both candidates tripping overthemselves to be more anti-China during global warming and upcoming food inflation spell the need risk reduction (if you plan on holding equities please buy puts to hedge.) TL;DR $TLT August call spreads, $TLT is the 20 year bond ETF. Pick companies you want to own 100 shares of by selling a put while long $GLD and long $SLV print money so holding the 100 shares prints money joining theta gang.
https://preview.redd.it/gp18bjnlabr41.jpg?width=768&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=6054e7f52e8d52da403016139ae43e0e799abf15 Download PDF of this article here:https://docdro.id/6eLgUPo In light of the recent fall in oil prices due to the Saudi-Russian dispute and dampening demand for oil due to the lockdowns implemented globally, O&G stocks have taken a severe beating, falling approximately 50% from their highs at the beginning of the year. Not spared from this onslaught is Hibiscus Petroleum Berhad (Hibiscus), a listed oil and gas (O&G) exploration and production (E&P) company. Why invest in O&G stocks in this particularly uncertain period? For one, valuations of these stocks have fallen to multi-year lows, bringing the potential ROI on these stocks to attractive levels. Oil prices are cyclical, and are bound to return to the mean given a sufficiently long time horizon. The trick is to find those companies who can survive through this downturn and emerge into “normal” profitability once oil prices rebound. In this article, I will explore the upsides and downsides of investing in Hibiscus. I will do my best to cater this report to newcomers to the O&G industry – rather than address exclusively experts and veterans of the O&G sector. As an equity analyst, I aim to provide a view on the company primarily, and will generally refrain from providing macro views on oil or opinions about secular trends of the sector. I hope you enjoy reading it! Stock code: 5199.KL Stock name: Hibiscus Petroleum Berhad Financial information and financial reports: https://www.malaysiastock.biz/Corporate-Infomation.aspx?securityCode=5199 Company website: https://www.hibiscuspetroleum.com/
Hibiscus Petroleum Berhad (5199.KL) is an oil and gas (O&G) upstream exploration and production (E&P) company located in Malaysia. As an E&P company, their business can be basically described as: · looking for oil, · drawing it out of the ground, and · selling it on global oil markets. This means Hibiscus’s profits are particularly exposed to fluctuating oil prices. With oil prices falling to sub-$30 from about $60 at the beginning of the year, Hibiscus’s stock price has also fallen by about 50% YTD – from around RM 1.00 to RM 0.45 (as of 5 April 2020). https://preview.redd.it/3dqc4jraabr41.png?width=641&format=png&auto=webp&s=7ba0e8614c4e9d781edfc670016a874b90560684 https://preview.redd.it/lvdkrf0cabr41.png?width=356&format=png&auto=webp&s=46f250a713887b06986932fa475dc59c7c28582e While the company is domiciled in Malaysia, its two main oil producing fields are located in both Malaysia and the UK. The Malaysian oil field is commonly referred to as the North Sabah field, while the UK oil field is commonly referred to as the Anasuria oil field. Hibiscus has licenses to other oil fields in different parts of the world, notably the Marigold/Sunflower oil fields in the UK and the VIC cluster in Australia, but its revenues and profits mainly stem from the former two oil producing fields. Given that it’s a small player and has only two primary producing oil fields, it’s not surprising that Hibiscus sells its oil to a concentrated pool of customers, with 2 of them representing 80% of its revenues (i.e. Petronas and BP). Fortunately, both these customers are oil supermajors, and are unlikely to default on their obligations despite low oil prices. At RM 0.45 per share, the market capitalization is RM 714.7m and it has a trailing PE ratio of about 5x. It doesn’t carry any debt, and it hasn’t paid a dividend in its listing history. The MD, Mr. Kenneth Gerard Pereira, owns about 10% of the company’s outstanding shares.
Reserves (Total recoverable oil) & Production (bbl/day)
To begin analyzing the company, it’s necessary to understand a little of the industry jargon. We’ll start with Reserves and Production. In general, there are three types of categories for a company’s recoverable oil volumes – Reserves, Contingent Resources and Prospective Resources. Reserves are those oil fields which are “commercial”, which is defined as below: As defined by the SPE PRMS,Reservesare “… quantities of petroleum anticipated to be commercially recoverable by application of development projects to known accumulations from a given date forward under defined conditions.” Therefore, Reserves must be discovered (by drilling, recoverable (with current technology), remaining in the subsurface (at the effective date of the evaluation) and “commercial” based on the development project proposed.) Note that Reserves are associated with development projects. To be considered as “commercial”, there must be a firm intention to proceed with the project in a reasonable time frame (typically 5 years, and such intention must be based upon all of the following criteria:) - A reasonable assessment of the future economics of the development project meeting defined investment and operating criteria;- A reasonable expectation that there will be a market for all or at least the expected sales quantities of production required to justify development;- Evidence that the necessary production and transportation facilities are available or can be made available; and- Evidence that legal, contractual, environmental and other social and economic concerns will allow for the actual implementation of the recovery project being evaluated. Contingent Resources and Prospective Resources are further defined as below: -Contingent Resources: potentially recoverable volumes associated with a development plan that targets discovered volumes but is not (yet commercial (as defined above); and)-Prospective Resources: potentially recoverable volumes associated with a development plan that targets as yet undiscovered volumes. In the industry lingo, we generally refer to Reserves as ‘P’ and Contingent Resources as ‘C’. These ‘P’ and ‘C’ resources can be further categorized into 1P/2P/3P resources and 1C/2C/3C resources, each referring to a low/medium/high estimate of the company’s potential recoverable oil volumes: - Low/1C/1P estimate: there should be reasonable certainty that volumes actually recovered will equal or exceed the estimate;- Best/2C/2P estimate: there should be an equal likelihood of the actual volumes of petroleum being larger or smaller than the estimate; and- High/3C/3P estimate: there is a low probability that the estimate will be exceeded. Hence in the E&P industry, it is easy to see why most investors and analysts refer to the 2P estimate as the best estimate for a company’s actual recoverable oil volumes. This is because 2P reserves (‘2P’ referring to ‘Proved and Probable’) are a middle estimate of the recoverable oil volumes legally recognized as “commercial”. However, there’s nothing stopping you from including 2C resources (riskier) or utilizing 1P resources (conservative) as your estimate for total recoverable oil volumes, depending on your risk appetite. In this instance, the company has provided a snapshot of its 2P and 2C resources in its analyst presentation: https://preview.redd.it/o8qejdyc8br41.png?width=710&format=png&auto=webp&s=b3ab9be8f83badf0206adc982feda3a558d43e78 Basically, what the company is saying here is that by 2021, it will have classified as 2P reserves at least 23.7 million bbl from its Anasuria field and 20.5 million bbl from its North Sabah field – for total 2P reserves of 44.2 million bbl (we are ignoring the Australian VIC cluster as it is only estimated to reach first oil by 2022). Furthermore, the company is stating that they have discovered (but not yet legally classified as “commercial”) a further 71 million bbl of oil from both the Anasuria and North Sabah fields, as well as the Marigold/Sunflower fields. If we include these 2C resources, the total potential recoverable oil volumes could exceed 100 million bbl. In this report, we shall explore all valuation scenarios giving consideration to both 2P and 2C resources. https://preview.redd.it/gk54qplf8br41.png?width=489&format=png&auto=webp&s=c905b7a6328432218b5b9dfd53cc9ef1390bd604 The company further targets a 2021 production rate of 20,000 bbl (LTM: 8,000 bbl), which includes 5,000 bbl from its Anasuria field (LTM: 2,500 bbl) and 7,000 bbl from its North Sabah field (LTM: 5,300 bbl). This is a substantial increase in forecasted production from both existing and prospective oil fields. If it materializes, annual production rate could be as high as 7,300 mmbbl, and 2021 revenues (given FY20 USD/bbl of $60) could exceed RM 1.5 billion (FY20: RM 988 million). However, this targeted forecast is quite a stretch from current production levels. Nevertheless, we shall consider all provided information in estimating a valuation for Hibiscus. To understand Hibiscus’s oil production capacity and forecast its revenues and profits, we need to have a better appreciation of the performance of its two main cash-generating assets – the North Sabah field and the Anasuria field. North Sabah oil field https://preview.redd.it/62nssexj8br41.png?width=1003&format=png&auto=webp&s=cd78f86d51165fb9a93015e49496f7f98dad64dd Hibiscus owns a 50% interest in the North Sabah field together with its partner Petronas, and has production rights over the field up to year 2040. The asset contains 4 oil fields, namely the St Joseph field, South Furious field, SF 30 field and Barton field. For the sake of brevity, we shall not delve deep into the operational aspects of the fields or the contractual nature of its production sharing contract (PSC). We’ll just focus on the factors which relate to its financial performance. These are: · Average uptime · Total oil sold · Average realized oil price · Average OPEX per bbl With regards to average uptime, we can see that the company maintains relative high facility availability, exceeding 90% uptime in all quarters of the LTM with exception of Jul-Sep 2019. The dip in average uptime was due to production enhancement projects and maintenance activities undertaken to improve the production capacity of the St Joseph and SF30 oil fields. Hence, we can conclude that management has a good handle on operational performance. It also implies that there is little room for further improvement in production resulting from increased uptime. As North Sabah is under a production sharing contract (PSC), there is a distinction between gross oil production and net oil production. The former relates to total oil drawn out of the ground, whereas the latter refers to Hibiscus’s share of oil production after taxes, royalties and expenses are accounted for. In this case, we want to pay attention to net oil production, not gross. We can arrive at Hibiscus’s total oil sold for the last twelve months (LTM) by adding up the total oil sold for each of the last 4 quarters. Summing up the figures yields total oil sold for the LTM of approximately 2,075,305 bbl. Then, we can arrive at an average realized oil price over the LTM by averaging the average realized oil price for the last 4 quarters, giving us an average realized oil price over the LTM of USD 68.57/bbl. We can do the same for average OPEX per bbl, giving us an average OPEX per bbl over the LTM of USD 13.23/bbl. Thus, we can sum up the above financial performance of the North Sabah field with the following figures: · Total oil sold: 2,075,305 bbl · Average realized oil price: USD 68.57/bbl · Average OPEX per bbl: USD 13.23/bbl Anasuria oil field https://preview.redd.it/586u4kfo8br41.png?width=1038&format=png&auto=webp&s=7580fc7f7df7e948754d025745a5cf47d4393c0f Doing the same exercise as above for the Anasuria field, we arrive at the following financial performance for the Anasuria field: · Total oil sold: 1,073,304 bbl · Average realized oil price: USD 63.57/bbl · Average OPEX per bbl: USD 23.22/bbl As gas production is relatively immaterial, and to be conservative, we shall only consider the crude oil production from the Anasuria field in forecasting revenues.
Valuation (Method 1)
Putting the figures from both oil fields together, we get the following data: https://preview.redd.it/7y6064dq8br41.png?width=700&format=png&auto=webp&s=2a4120563a011cf61fc6090e1cd5932602599dc2 Given that we have determined LTM EBITDA of RM 632m, the next step would be to subtract ITDA (interest, tax, depreciation & amortization) from it to obtain estimated LTM Net Profit. Using FY2020’s ITDA of approximately RM 318m as a guideline, we arrive at an estimated LTM Net Profit of RM 314m (FY20: 230m). Given the current market capitalization of RM 714.7m, this implies a trailing LTM PE of 2.3x. Performing a sensitivity analysis given different oil prices, we arrive at the following net profit table for the company under different oil price scenarios, assuming oil production rate and ITDA remain constant: https://preview.redd.it/xixge5sr8br41.png?width=433&format=png&auto=webp&s=288a00f6e5088d01936f0217ae7798d2cfcf11f2 From the above exercise, it becomes apparent that Hibiscus has a breakeven oil price of about USD 41.8863/bbl, and has a lot of operating leverage given the exponential rate of increase in its Net Profit with each consequent increase in oil prices. Considering that the oil production rate (EBITDA) is likely to increase faster than ITDA’s proportion to revenues (fixed costs), at an implied PE of 4.33x, it seems likely that an investment in Hibiscus will be profitable over the next 10 years (with the assumption that oil prices will revert to the mean in the long-term).
Valuation (Method 2)
Of course, there are a lot of assumptions behind the above method of valuation. Hence, it would be prudent to perform multiple methods of valuation and compare the figures to one another. As opposed to the profit/loss assessment in Valuation (Method 1), another way of performing a valuation would be to estimate its balance sheet value, i.e. total revenues from 2P Reserves, and assign a reasonable margin to it. https://preview.redd.it/o2eiss6u8br41.png?width=710&format=png&auto=webp&s=03960cce698d9cedb076f3d5f571b3c59d908fa8 From the above, we understand that Hibiscus’s 2P reserves from the North Sabah and Anasuria fields alone are approximately 44.2 mmbbl (we ignore contribution from Australia’s VIC cluster as it hasn’t been developed yet). Doing a similar sensitivity analysis of different oil prices as above, we arrive at the following estimated total revenues and accumulated net profit: https://preview.redd.it/h8hubrmw8br41.png?width=450&format=png&auto=webp&s=6d23f0f9c3dafda89e758b815072ba335467f33e Let’s assume that the above average of RM 9.68 billion in total realizable revenues from current 2P reserves holds true. If we assign a conservative Net Profit margin of 15% (FY20: 23%; past 5 years average: 16%), we arrive at estimated accumulated Net Profit from 2P Reserves ofRM 1.452 billion. Given the current market capitalization of RM 714 million, we might be able to say that the equity is worth about twice the current share price. However, it is understandable that some readers might feel that the figures used in the above estimate (e.g. net profit margin of 15%) were randomly plucked from the sky. So how do we reconcile them with figures from the financial statements? Fortunately, there appears to be a way to do just that. Intangible Assets I refer you to a figure in the financial statements which provides a shortcut to the valuation of 2P Reserves. This is the carrying value of Intangible Assets on the Balance Sheet. As of 2QFY21, that amount was RM 1,468,860,000 (i.e. RM 1.468 billion). https://preview.redd.it/hse8ttb09br41.png?width=881&format=png&auto=webp&s=82e48b5961c905fe9273cb6346368de60202ebec Quite coincidentally, one might observe that this figure is dangerously close to the estimated accumulated Net Profit from 2P Reserves of RM 1.452 billion we calculated earlier. But why would this amount matter at all? To answer that, I refer you to the notes of the Annual Report FY20 (AR20). On page 148 of the AR20, we find the following two paragraphs: E&E assets comprise of rights and concession and conventional studies. Following the acquisition of a concession right to explore a licensed area, the costs incurred such as geological and geophysical surveys, drilling, commercial appraisal costs and other directly attributable costs of exploration and appraisal including technical and administrative costs, are capitalised as conventional studies, presented as intangible assets. E&E assets are assessed for impairment when facts and circumstances suggest that the carrying amount of an E&E asset may exceed its recoverable amount. The Group will allocate E&E assets to cash generating unit (“CGU”s or groups of CGUs for the purpose of assessing such assets for impairment. Each CGU or group of units to which an E&E asset is allocated will not be larger than an operating segment as disclosed in Note 39 to the financial statements.) Hence, we can determine that firstly, the intangible asset value represents capitalized costs of acquisition of the oil fields, including technical exploration costs and costs of acquiring the relevant licenses. Secondly, an impairment review will be carried out when “the carrying amount of an E&E asset may exceed its recoverable amount”, with E&E assets being allocated to “cash generating units” (CGU) for the purposes of assessment. On page 169 of the AR20, we find the following: Carrying amounts of the Group’s intangible assets, oil and gas assets and FPSO are reviewed for possible impairment annually including any indicators of impairment. For the purpose of assessing impairment, assets are grouped at the lowest level CGUs for which there is a separately identifiable cash flow available. These CGUs are based on operating areas, represented by the 2011 North Sabah EOR PSC (“North Sabah”, the Anasuria Cluster, the Marigold and Sunflower fields, the VIC/P57 exploration permit (“VIC/P57”) and the VIC/L31 production license (“VIC/L31”).) So apparently, the CGUs that have been assigned refer to the respective oil producing fields, two of which include the North Sabah field and the Anasuria field. In order to perform the impairment review, estimates of future cash flow will be made by management to assess the “recoverable amount” (as described above), subject to assumptions and an appropriate discount rate. Hence, what we can gather up to now is that management will estimate future recoverable cash flows from a CGU (i.e. the North Sabah and Anasuria oil fields), compare that to their carrying value, and perform an impairment if their future recoverable cash flows are less than their carrying value. In other words, if estimated accumulated profits from the North Sabah and Anasuria oil fields are less than their carrying value, an impairment is required. So where do we find the carrying values for the North Sabah and Anasuria oil fields? Further down on page 184 in the AR20, we see the following: Included in rights and concession are the carrying amounts of producing field licenses in the Anasuria Cluster amounting to RM668,211,518 (2018: RM687,664,530, producing field licenses in North Sabah amounting to RM471,031,008 (2018: RM414,333,116)) Hence, we can determine that the carrying values for the North Sabah and Anasuria oil fields are RM 471m and RM 668m respectively. But where do we find the future recoverable cash flows of the fields as estimated by management, and what are the assumptions used in that calculation? Fortunately, we find just that on page 185: 17 INTANGIBLE ASSETS (CONTINUED) (a Anasuria Cluster) The Directors have concluded that there is no impairment indicator for Anasuria Cluster during the current financial year. In the previous financial year, due to uncertainties in crude oil prices, the Group has assessed the recoverable amount of the intangible assets, oil and gas assets and FPSO relating to the Anasuria Cluster. The recoverable amount is determined using the FVLCTS model based on discounted cash flows (“DCF” derived from the expected cash in/outflow pattern over the production lives.) The key assumptions used to determine the recoverable amount for the Anasuria Cluster were as follows: (i Discount rate of 10%;) (ii Future cost inflation factor of 2% per annum;) (iii Oil price forecast based on the oil price forward curve from independent parties; and,) (iv Oil production profile based on the assessment by independent oil and gas reserve experts.) Based on the assessments performed, the Directors concluded that the recoverable amount calculated based on the valuation model is higher than the carrying amount. (b North Sabah) The acquisition of the North Sabah assets was completed in the previous financial year. Details of the acquisition are as disclosed in Note 15 to the financial statements. The Directors have concluded that there is no impairment indicator for North Sabah during the current financial year. Here, we can see that the recoverable amount of the Anasuria field was estimated based on a DCF of expected future cash flows over the production life of the asset. The key assumptions used by management all seem appropriate, including a discount rate of 10% and oil price and oil production estimates based on independent assessment. From there, management concludes that the recoverable amount of the Anasuria field is higher than its carrying amount (i.e. no impairment required). Likewise, for the North Sabah field. How do we interpret this? Basically, what management is saying is that given a 10% discount rate and independent oil price and oil production estimates, the accumulated profits (i.e. recoverable amount) from both the North Sabah and the Anasuria fields exceed their carrying amounts of RM 471m and RM 668m respectively. In other words, according to management’s own estimates, the carrying value of the Intangible Assets of RM 1.468 billionapproximates the accumulated Net Profit recoverable from 2P reserves. To conclude Valuation (Method 2), we arrive at the following:
Accumulated Net Profit from 2P Reserves
RM 1.452 billion
RM 1.468 billion
By now, we have established the basic economics of Hibiscus’s business, including its revenues (i.e. oil production and oil price scenarios), costs (OPEX, ITDA), profitability (breakeven, future earnings potential) and balance sheet value (2P reserves, valuation). Moving on, we want to gain a deeper understanding of the 3 statements to anticipate any blind spots and risks. We’ll refer to the financial statements of both the FY20 annual report and the 2Q21 quarterly report in this analysis. For the sake of brevity, I’ll only point out those line items which need extra attention, and skip over the rest. Feel free to go through the financial statements on your own to gain a better familiarity of the business. https://preview.redd.it/h689bss79br41.png?width=810&format=png&auto=webp&s=ed47fce6a5c3815dd3d4f819e31f1ce39ccf4a0b Income Statement First, we’ll start with the Income Statement on page 135 of the AR20. Revenues are straightforward, as we’ve discussed above. Cost of Sales and Administrative Expenses fall under the jurisdiction of OPEX, which we’ve also seen earlier. Other Expenses are mostly made up of Depreciation & Amortization of RM 115m. Finance Costs are where things start to get tricky. Why does a company which carries no debt have such huge amounts of finance costs? The reason can be found in Note 8, where it is revealed that the bulk of finance costs relate to the unwinding of discount of provision for decommissioning costs of RM 25m (Note 32). https://preview.redd.it/4omjptbe9br41.png?width=1019&format=png&auto=webp&s=eaabfc824134063100afa62edfd36a34a680fb60 This actually refers to the expected future costs of restoring the Anasuria and North Sabah fields to their original condition once the oil reserves have been depleted. Accounting standards require the company to provide for these decommissioning costs as they are estimable and probable. The way the decommissioning costs are accounted for is the same as an amortized loan, where the initial carrying value is recognized as a liability and the discount rate applied is reversed each year as an expense on the Income Statement. However, these expenses are largely non-cash in nature and do not necessitate a cash outflow every year (FY20: RM 69m). Unwinding of discount on non-current other payables of RM 12m relate to contractual payments to the North Sabah sellers. We will discuss it later. Taxation is another tricky subject, and is even more significant than Finance Costs at RM 161m. In gist, Hibiscus is subject to the 38% PITA (Petroleum Income Tax Act) under Malaysian jurisdiction, and the 30% Petroleum tax + 10% Supplementary tax under UK jurisdiction. Of the RM 161m, RM 41m of it relates to deferred tax which originates from the difference between tax treatment and accounting treatment on capitalized assets (accelerated depreciation vs straight-line depreciation). Nonetheless, what you should take away from this is that the tax expense is a tangible expense and material to breakeven analysis. Fortunately, tax is a variable expense, and should not materially impact the cash flow of Hibiscus in today’s low oil price environment. Note: Cash outflows for Tax Paid in FY20 was RM 97m, substantially below the RM 161m tax expense. https://preview.redd.it/1xrnwzm89br41.png?width=732&format=png&auto=webp&s=c078bc3e18d9c79d9a6fbe1187803612753f69d8 Balance Sheet The balance sheet of Hibiscus is unexciting; I’ll just bring your attention to those line items which need additional scrutiny. I’ll use the figures in the latest 2Q21 quarterly report (2Q21) and refer to the notes in AR20 for clarity. We’ve already discussed Intangible Assets in the section above, so I won’t dwell on it again. Moving on, the company has Equipment of RM 582m, largely relating to O&G assets (e.g. the Anasuria FPSO vessel and CAPEX incurred on production enhancement projects). Restricted cash and bank balances represent contractual obligations for decommissioning costs of the Anasuria Cluster, and are inaccessible for use in operations. Inventories are relatively low, despite Hibiscus being an E&P company, so forex fluctuations on carrying value of inventories are relatively immaterial. Trade receivables largely relate to entitlements from Petronas and BP (both oil supermajors), and are hence quite safe from impairment. Other receivables, deposits and prepayments are significant as they relate to security deposits placed with sellers of the oil fields acquired; these should be ignored for cash flow purposes. Note: Total cash and bank balances do not include approximately RM 105 m proceeds from the North Sabah December 2019 offtake (which was received in January 2020) Cash and bank balances of RM 90m do not include RM 105m of proceeds from offtake received in 3Q21 (Jan 2020). Hence, the actual cash and bank balances as of 2Q21 approximate RM 200m. Liabilities are a little more interesting. First, I’ll draw your attention to the significant Deferred tax liabilities of RM 457m. These largely relate to the amortization of CAPEX (i.e. Equipment and capitalized E&E expenses), which is given an accelerated depreciation treatment for tax purposes. The way this works is that the government gives Hibiscus a favorable tax treatment on capital expenditures incurred via an accelerated depreciation schedule, so that the taxable income is less than usual. However, this leads to the taxable depreciation being utilized quicker than accounting depreciation, hence the tax payable merely deferred to a later period – when the tax depreciation runs out but accounting depreciation remains. Given the capital intensive nature of the business, it is understandable why Deferred tax liabilities are so large. We’ve discussed Provision for decommissioning costs under the Finance Costs section earlier. They are also quite significant at RM 266m. Notably, the Other Payables and Accruals are a hefty RM 431m. What do they relate to? Basically, they are contractual obligations to the sellers of the oil fields which are only payable upon oil prices reaching certain thresholds. Hence, while they are current in nature, they will only become payable when oil prices recover to previous highs, and are hence not an immediate cash outflow concern given today’s low oil prices. Cash Flow Statement There is nothing in the cash flow statement which warrants concern. Notably, the company generated OCF of approximately RM 500m in FY20 and RM 116m in 2Q21. It further incurred RM 330m and RM 234m of CAPEX in FY20 and 2Q21 respectively, largely owing to production enhancement projects to increase the production rate of the Anasuria and North Sabah fields, which according to management estimates are accretive to ROI. Tax paid was RM 97m in FY20 and RM 61m in 2Q21 (tax expense: RM 161m and RM 62m respectively).
There are a few obvious and not-so-obvious risks that one should be aware of before investing in Hibiscus. We shall not consider operational risks (e.g. uptime, OPEX) as they are outside the jurisdiction of the equity analyst. Instead, we shall focus on the financial and strategic risks largely outside the control of management. The main ones are: · Oil prices remaining subdued for long periods of time · Fluctuation of exchange rates · Customer concentration risk · 2P Reserves being less than estimated · Significant current and non-current liabilities · Potential issuance of equity Oil prices remaining subdued Of topmost concern in the minds of most analysts is whether Hibiscus has the wherewithal to sustain itself through this period of low oil prices (sub-$30). A quick and dirty estimate of annual cash outflow (i.e. burn rate) assuming a $20 oil world and historical production rates is between RM 50m-70m per year, which considering the RM 200m cash balance implies about 3-4 years of sustainability before the company runs out of cash and has to rely on external assistance for financing. Table 1: Hibiscus EBITDA at different oil price and exchange rates https://preview.redd.it/gxnekd6h9br41.png?width=670&format=png&auto=webp&s=edbfb9621a43480d11e3b49de79f61a6337b3d51 The above table shows different EBITDA scenarios (RM ‘m) given different oil prices (left column) and USD:MYR exchange rates (top row). Currently, oil prices are $27 and USD:MYR is 1:4.36. Given conservative assumptions of average OPEX/bbl of $20 (current: $15), we can safely say that the company will be loss-making as long as oil remains at $20 or below (red). However, we can see that once oil prices hit $25, the company can tank the lower-end estimate of the annual burn rate of RM 50m (orange), while at RM $27 it can sufficiently muddle through the higher-end estimate of the annual burn rate of RM 70m (green). Hence, we can assume that as long as the average oil price over the next 3-4 years remains above $25, Hibiscus should come out of this fine without the need for any external financing. Customer Concentration Risk With regards to customer concentration risk, there is not much the analyst or investor can do except to accept the risk. Fortunately, 80% of revenues can be attributed to two oil supermajors (Petronas and BP), hence the risk of default on contractual obligations and trade receivables seems to be quite diminished. 2P Reserves being less than estimated 2P Reserves being less than estimated is another risk that one should keep in mind. Fortunately, the current market cap is merely RM 714m – at half of estimated recoverable amounts of RM 1.468 billion – so there’s a decent margin of safety. In addition, there are other mitigating factors which shall be discussed in the next section (‘Opportunities’). Significant non-current and current liabilities The significant non-current and current liabilities have been addressed in the previous section. It has been determined that they pose no threat to immediate cash flow due to them being long-term in nature (e.g. decommissioning costs, deferred tax, etc). Hence, for the purpose of assessing going concern, their amounts should not be a cause for concern. Potential issuance of equity Finally, we come to the possibility of external financing being required in this low oil price environment. While the company should last 3-4 years on existing cash reserves, there is always the risk of other black swan events materializing (e.g. coronavirus) or simply oil prices remaining muted for longer than 4 years. Furthermore, management has hinted that they wish to acquire new oil assets at presently depressed prices to increase daily production rate to a targeted 20,000 bbl by end-2021. They have room to acquire debt, but they may also wish to issue equity for this purpose. Hence, the possibility of dilution to existing shareholders cannot be entirely ruled out. However, given management’s historical track record of prioritizing ROI and optimal capital allocation, and in consideration of the fact that the MD owns 10% of outstanding shares, there is some assurance that any potential acquisitions will be accretive to EPS and therefore valuations.
As with the existence of risk, the presence of material opportunities also looms over the company. Some of them are discussed below: · Increased Daily Oil Production Rate · Inclusion of 2C Resources · Future oil prices exceeding $50 and effects from coronavirus dissipating Increased Daily Oil Production Rate The first and most obvious opportunity is the potential for increased production rate. We’ve seen in the last quarter (2Q21) that the North Sabah field increased its daily production rate by approximately 20% as a result of production enhancement projects (infill drilling), lowering OPEX/bbl as a result. To vastly oversimplify, infill drilling is the process of maximizing well density by drilling in the spaces between existing wells to improve oil production. The same improvements are being undertaken at the Anasuria field via infill drilling, subsea debottlenecking, water injection and sidetracking of existing wells. Without boring you with industry jargon, this basically means future production rate is likely to improve going forward. By how much can the oil production rate be improved by? Management estimates in their analyst presentation that enhancements in the Anasuria field will be able to yield 5,000 bbl/day by 2021 (current: 2,500 bbl/day). Similarly, improvements in the North Sabah field is expected to yield 7,000 bbl/day by 2021 (current: 5,300 bbl/day). This implies a total 2021 expected daily production rate from the two fields alone of 12,000 bbl/day (current: 8,000 bbl/day). That’s a 50% increase in yields which we haven’t factored into our valuation yet. Furthermore, we haven’t considered any production from existing 2C resources (e.g. Marigold/Sunflower) or any potential acquisitions which may occur in the future. By management estimates, this can potentially increase production by another 8,000 bbl/day, bringing total production to 20,000 bbl/day. While this seems like a stretch of the imagination, it pays to keep them in mind when forecasting future revenues and valuations. Just to play around with the numbers, I’ve come up with a sensitivity analysis of possible annual EBITDA at different oil prices and daily oil production rates: Table 2: Hibiscus EBITDA at different oil price and daily oil production rates https://preview.redd.it/jnpfhr5n9br41.png?width=814&format=png&auto=webp&s=bbe4b512bc17f576d87529651140cc74cde3d159 The left column represents different oil prices while the top row represents different daily oil production rates. The green column represents EBITDA at current daily production rate of 8,000 bbl/day; the orange column represents EBITDA at targeted daily production rate of 12,000 bbl/day; while the purple column represents EBITDA at maximum daily production rate of 20,000 bbl/day. Even conservatively assuming increased estimated annual ITDA of RM 500m (FY20: RM 318m), and long-term average oil prices of $50 (FY20: $60), the estimated Net Profit and P/E ratio is potentially lucrative at daily oil production rates of 12,000 bbl/day and above. 2C Resources Since we’re on the topic of improved daily oil production rate, it bears to pay in mind the relatively enormous potential from Hibiscus’s 2C Resources. North Sabah’s 2C Resources alone exceed 30 mmbbl; while those from the yet undiagnosed Marigold/Sunflower fields also reach 30 mmbbl. Altogether, 2C Resources exceed 70 mmbbl, which dwarfs the 44 mmbbl of 2P Reserves we have considered up to this point in our valuation estimates. To refresh your memory, 2C Resources represents oil volumes which have been discovered but are not yet classified as “commercial”. This means that there is reasonable certainty of the oil being recoverable, as opposed to simply being in the very early stages of exploration. So, to be conservative, we will imagine that only 50% of 2C Resources are eligible for reclassification to 2P reserves, i.e. 35 mmbbl of oil. https://preview.redd.it/mto11iz7abr41.png?width=375&format=png&auto=webp&s=e9028ab0816b3d3e25067447f2c70acd3ebfc41a This additional 35 mmbbl of oil represents an 80% increase to existing 2P reserves. Assuming the daily oil production rate increases similarly by 80%, we will arrive at 14,400 bbl/day of oil production. According to Table 2 above, this would yield an EBITDA of roughly RM 630m assuming $50 oil. Comparing that estimated EBITDA to FY20’s actual EBITDA:
FY21 (incl. 2C)
Daily oil production (bbl/day)
Average oil price (USD/bbl)
Average OPEX/bbl (USD)
EBITDA (RM ‘m)
Hence, even conservatively assuming lower oil prices and higher OPEX/bbl (which should decrease in the presence of higher oil volumes) than last year, we get approximately the same EBITDA as FY20. For the sake of completeness, let’s assume that Hibiscus issues twice the no. of existing shares over the next 10 years, effectively diluting shareholders by 50%. Even without accounting for the possibility of the acquisition of new oil fields, at the current market capitalization of RM 714m, the prospective P/E would be about 10x. Not too shabby. Future oil prices exceeding $50 and effects from coronavirus dissipating Hibiscus shares have recently been hit by a one-two punch from oil prices cratering from $60 to $30, as a result of both the Saudi-Russian dispute and depressed demand for oil due to coronavirus. This has massively increased supply and at the same time hugely depressed demand for oil (due to the globally coordinated lockdowns being implemented). Given a long enough timeframe, I fully expect OPEC+ to come to an agreement and the economic effects from the coronavirus to dissipate, allowing oil prices to rebound. As we equity investors are aware, oil prices are cyclical and are bound to recover over the next 10 years. When it does, valuations of O&G stocks (including Hibiscus’s) are likely to improve as investors overshoot expectations and begin to forecast higher oil prices into perpetuity, as they always tend to do in good times. When that time arrives, Hibiscus’s valuations are likely to become overoptimistic as all O&G stocks tend to do during oil upcycles, resulting in valuations far exceeding reasonable estimates of future earnings. If you can hold the shares up until then, it’s likely you will make much more on your investment than what we’ve been estimating.
Wrapping up what we’ve discussed so far, we can conclude that Hibiscus’s market capitalization of RM 714m far undershoots reasonable estimates of fair value even under conservative assumptions of recoverable oil volumes and long-term average oil prices. As a value investor, I hesitate to assign a target share price, but it’s safe to say that this stock is worth at least RM 1.00 (current: RM 0.45). Risk is relatively contained and the upside far exceeds the downside. While I have no opinion on the short-term trajectory of oil prices, I can safely recommend this stock as a long-term Buy based on fundamental research.
Seeing the mentions and feel good messaging coming out about this operation lately piqued my curiosity. Normally, I don’t follow companies that spend on self-promotion around stock price, but one of our mods asked for this, and I wanted to see if there is visible cracks between messaging and reality. There are several, as this outfit has delayed operational announcements, and executed a sale/leaseback to free up cashflow.
Capitalized PP&E greater than goodwill/intangibles. Still 30% of assets.
Despite sales shrinking over the same period a year earlier, margins vastly improving
Lots of hype over the sales distribution network that LTYR brings. Sunnviva paid $8MM for it. Looks like entire value is for licence to distribute.
G&A and SBC $8MM this quarter (yeesh)
Dumped more than a million on forex losses. Given native currency accretion, this logically should be the other way round.
Note 12(e) illustrates a sale/leaseback on buildings and land. Typically, this is a financing vehicle to free up cash flow. Could be considered a desperate move for money, or a strategic focus on operations.
Note 12(g) shows option overhang. Number o/s isn’t massive, but the 8 year tenors are. Extremely rich compensation. The flip side is that mgmt has greater incentive for the longer term. All to the eye of the beholder here.
Note 14(d) explains the forex risk they’re wearing. The delta they report isn’t accurate tho.
Note 15 is one somewhat problematic to me: Related Party transactions. 15(c) is a good example.
Good disclosure on business segments - Note 16. Can’t speak to veracity.
Sales and Marketing expenses relatively low. This will be tested by the new distribution agreement - inasmuch as margin decay and product flow though costs will accrue here.
Capitalizing the build out ($25MM) will end up likely as leasehold improvements on balance sheet. Net $0 to assets.
All in all, it has the feel of a business in build out, and being somewhat behind the capital train’s lead car. Coinciding with the expanded messaging about the company, they’ve just come to market this morning looking for $10MM to provide working capital until expected revenues materialize. 25% of the total amount is being picked up by management. Coincidental? I’m neither ‘fur or ‘agin’ this outfit. Their SBC/G&A is very high for what they’ve achieved, and they’re putting much risk into the California rollout. Looking at their cash and leverage, it puts a lot onto making a splash right away. They’ve put sales numbers to the LTYR potential. With a payback period I eyeball at 3-4yrs. Under their projections, it suggests the buy was good. Tough thing is, it’s all promise. The share price decline they’ve had (and shared with many others) over the past year has stressed access to capital, and much is riding on this distribution deal. The related party transactions are somewhat concerning to me. They’ve made money across management in real estate transactions, construction contracts, legal fees, and consulting gigs. The reader should note this isn’t nefarious on its’ face - it’s not uncommon to have a tight mgmt team rely on each other’s competencies during build, but the intensity is somewhat high (Note 15). For in-sector risk, this one seems to have a lot riding going into a competitive, mature market. Discounts sought by retail for wholesale product a definite threat to margins, and a rough couple of quarters (or slowed realization) of sales expansion will stress cashflow. All I see here is promises, some revenue, & expensive in-house resourcing. I am not close enough (or knowledgeable) about the company and it’s products and the market with which it is heading full steam, into. The valuation I get - including LTYR revenue numbers - comes in at less than the share price value it’s at now, fwiw. The preceding is the opinion of the author, and not intended to be used to buy or sell any equity or derivatives - or anything else for that matter
Well, their financials are becoming a phone book. And the breadth of their business topology is wide. I haven't been able to do it justice, but, in tandem with the last look - there is a picture emerging. I've been jammed past couple of days.... Straight to it:
Sales ramping, but curious to see A/R expansion. They’ve stopped aging them for some reason - but $3.4MM of it looks to be interco lending.
Inventory detail very good. Benchmark as far as I’ve seen in sector.
Doing a lot of things everywhere. More focused than CGC, but still. Many, many balls in the air. Speaking of air, Battley’s gonna have a million air miles on his loyalty card by third Q.
Notes 11 & 12 - relatively good disclosure. And given the breadth of their interests…..sigh. Poor me. I again asked the elves for an assist, and they just left for the bar.
Good to see their structuring around the CanvasRx deal in Note 12a. Performance tied, and even has floors to prevent Canvas Rx from owning ACB xD
LIQ investment of $100MM contains $66MM of goodwill.
Speaking of goodwill, I’d mentioned CanvasRx’s addition last time. But now there’s almost $900MM of it on the balance sheet. $800MM of that came from the $54MM in CMED assets they bought. Yeesh. I need a cold cloth.
I need an Rx to approach Note 17. Don’t care what the Rx is for either, I’ll take anything.
SBC: 1.5MM of sub $1 options, 25MM of others (15MM sub $2),multi year warrants….etc etc. SBC isn’t going to subside anytime soon. $150MM to come as is. Years of optionality left as well.
$9MM/q G&A, $6MM/q sales and marketing. Heavy load. Look to consumer product segment spends for comparable. This is 3x higher than for co’s with existing sales over $100MM. Ramping might be a rationale, but I’m befuddled by this level tbh given some peers at this stage of the industry. Maybe just aura and brand establishment, but still….
$1.1MM is in sales force wages alone. Per quarter. That's a 40 headcount to me. Wow.
Spend ramping in CanvasRx, it’s going to be their poster boy
Non-material: but seriously - a $400k loss on forex? I just don’t get this. Take the exposure out people….it’s easy. Honest. Call a trusted friend, or just call me.
Note 6(v) - eye bleach. This is the problem when you buy shovels during a gold rush. Companies aren’t exempt from it. Recently, I noted that the best asset Namaste has is it’s alignment with ACB. Shittiest asset ACB has on it’s books is the deal with Namaste. Good thing the option valuation they did came in at $300k, otw they’d take a far bigger bath
Ok. I’m going to wait for a couple of events before commenting further. There’s alot more to say, but, there’s a ton of contingencies in here on sales flow. Even more than other industry participants. In the totality of this, they are lining up to a moment: it being when sales go live. Anything I’d say would be preemptive to some degree. There is a few things I can opine on though. The numbers around this company - from share count to goodwill to subs/JV’s are bracing. I mean, an appropriate adjective for it eludes me at the moment. Only comparable would be CGC in terms of ‘wow’ factor here, but ACB is much simpler in several respects. Their risks centre around sales numbers, which will need to support a high nested cost of capital, and to realize the goodwill they’ve been accumulating faster than actual assets. I’ll say their disclosure is very good, and frankly, a tip o’ the cap to accounting again (hi guys….<3). I don’t know about aggregate quality of the balance sheet though. I’ve heard Cam say it’s strong, but perhaps he’s seeing it with earnings required to support it. I see a lot of earnings required to support this as is. If the balance sheet is strong anywhere, it’s in the legs required to hold it up. Lots of promises of cashflow need to come to support it. Let alone share price.
Apple Card Review: A (Mostly) Rewarding Way to Pay
I spent a few days hopping around New York City last week, trying to keep my wallet in my pocket. It wasn’t that I was on a tight budget. But I was testing the Apple Card, the new credit card from Apple, and according to its reward program, that’s the most lucrative way to shop. Introduced back in March, the Apple Card is now generally available to anyone with an Apple mobile device who wants to apply. If you use the Apple Card via the wireless, contactless Apple Pay system that is becoming increasingly popular with iPhone owners and businesses alike, you get a fairly generous return on every purchase of 2% cash back, no strings attached. That’s a bonus which lines up with the best credit cards around, from major issuers like JP Morgan Chase and Bank of America. So when I grabbed a cup of coffee and a cookie at a cute bakery on the Upper West Side, for example, paying with the Apple Card through my iPhone earned me an almost immediate refund of 11 cents on my $5.63 purchase. (The cookie was good, too.) Later, after traipsing around on a hot summer day, I picked up a $2.87 bottle of water at CVS, also using wireless Apple Pay. Along with the hydration, I scored 6 cents cash back. A big difference between this credit card and its competition is that unlike other rebate cards, the Apple Card’s cash reward appears almost immediately after the purchase is processed. To access these funds, you simply open the Wallet app on your iPhone, which is the home of Apple Card itself, showing your current balance, recent transactions, and other info updated in almost real time. The Wallet app also displays your “Daily Cash Balance.” These funds can be spent like a debit card on purchases using the digital Apple Pay Cash card, sent to a friend via Apple Pay, or even used to partially pay off the balance on your Apple Card. There’s another, better benefit to using the Apple Card: Paying for purchases from Apple using the digital credit card earns 3% cash back. For example, my family’s $5 per month _New York Times_cooking app subscription now brings back 15 cents each month. And the $120 a year I pay for a family iCloud storage plan earns $3.60 in rewards. And if I decide finally to upgrade my aging MacBook Pro with the rumored 16-inch model coming later this year (please revamp the keyboard, Apple!), the cash back perk will be even more substantial—$90 on a $3,000 purchase, for example. There’s no other way to get such high rebates on purchases directly from Apple (though some cards affiliated with retailers like Target and Amazon will give 5%, if you’re buying Apple hardware sold at those outlets).
Taking a swipe at other cards
Drone Strikes Are Escalating a Geopolitical Crisis—Which Could Help the Dollar
Investors rushing back to risk assets this month just got a reminder of the kind of simmering geopolitical threats out there. That could be good news for the dollar. The drone strike on one of the world’s biggest oil facilities over the weekend raises the specter of escalating tensions across the Middle East — exactly the kind of scenario that typically fuels demand for assets denominated in the world’s reserve currency. “Any retaliatory measures by Saudi Arabia would inevitably lead to an increased geopolitical risk scenario, i.e. the demand for safe-haven currencies can be expected to remain buoyant,” wrote Marc-André Fongern, strategist at MAF Global Forex. “From a fundamental perspective, there is still hardly any alternative to the dollar.” Throw in still-festering trade tensions, record policy uncertainty, weak growth in Europe — with no fiscal stimulus in sight — and the continued outperformance of American markets, and the stage may be set for a new phase of greenback strength if the bulls have it right. Even after a September pullback, the dollar is the best performing G-10 currency this quarter, and the Bloomberg Dollar Spot Index remains close to levels notched two years ago. The latter gained 0.3% at 10:19 a.m. in New York on Monday as the drone strike in Saudi Arabia rippled through markets. The latest flow data underscore the kind of support the exchange rate is enjoying from global investors these days. Numbers from EPFR Global Data released last week show cash was piling into stocks amid the global bond sell-off, but beneath the surface it all headed one way: American equity funds attracted more than $17 billion in the week through Sept. 11. Shares in Europe, Japan and the emerging markets all recorded outflows.
As the trade war drags on, haven demand for the U.S. currency is likely to continue, according to Ned Rumpeltin, the European head of G-10 currency strategy at Toronto Dominion Bank. He points out there have been several false dawns in the protectionist spat, and says it’ll be no surprise if that happens again. “The dollar remains the best house in a very bad neighborhood,” he said. “There are few places in the G-10 where the dollar can underperform.” Analysis from JPMorgan Chase& Co. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. shows the dollar is getting a lift from weakness in developing nations spurred by fears of a slowdown in China. Absent a significant pick-up in risk appetite that diminishes the dollar’s flight-to-quality credentials, even fresh U.S. monetary easing would struggle to materially undercut the currency, according to Jane Foley, Rabobank’s head of currency strategy.
There remains plenty of ammo for dollar bears. The U.S. has twin deficits and the greenback is the most expensive G-10 currency based on the Bank for International Settlement’s real effective exchange rate. One of the biggest bulls — HSBC Holdings Plc — acknowledges risks are rising to its strong-dollar call issued in April 2018. In a recent note, it stress-tested the potential impact of three scenarios: fiscal stimulus outside America, thawing trade relations, and U.S. intervention to weaken the currency. They all pose “serious negative consequences” for the greenback, HSBC said. But nominal rate differentials matter in a world where more than $13 trillion of bonds globally yield below zero. Around 60 trillion yen ($560 billion) Japanese government bonds with a coupon of over 1% will mature within three years and that money is likely to be reinvested in U.S. bonds where the whole curve is still positive, said Naoya Oshikubo, a senior economist at Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Asset Management. The company is one of the managers of Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund, the world’s largest. “The dollar will be well supported because of these flows,” Oshikubo said. Japanese investors bought 2.47 trillion yen of U.S. government bonds in July, the most since 2016, according to the latest data. “The dollar is still ticking a lot of boxes for a currency to be long: high liquidity, high security, high yield. Its economic situation still better than others,” said Andreas Koenig, head of global foreign exchange at Amundi Asset Management. “It’s difficult to find attractive alternatives.”
I'm doing a tribute to the 24 days of Christmas by going over the financial statements of 24 companies that are considered downrange, speculative, and just plain high risk. Our first six stops is fondly captured here, the second one is here. All opinions are my own, and certainly not a recommendation for or against any of them, or to buy or sell. Many are companies I've never looked at before. In some cases, I'd never even heard of them. I limited myself to 45mins to each, and kept mainly to most recent financial statements and MD&A's. You'll likely know more about the company than me if you're following them. This is only my reactions with a brief commentary about what I saw in the financial statements. QCC - Quadron Cannatech Corp
Business risk of product is in being islanded.
Returns driven by manufacturing.
Doubled sales, losses multiplied by 20x in same timeframe
Some sales in the pipe, income statement will improve over next six months.
Capital structure is shitty, but in line with this peerset. These guys have the added bonus of sigh not one, but two (2!) classes of preferred as well.
Nice motivation built into Note 9 on class B preferred shares. Wish more companies did this.
Options and warrants outstanding are long dated, plentiful, and very expensive.
If one wants exposure to peripherals, this is one way. Financials aren’t bad, but manufacturers won’t drive the same margins demanded by share price levels, and only indirectly connected to cannabis. Cheap foreign goods an ever present threat. CMM - Canabo Medical Inc.
Did a share repo on November 28. Don’t hear that often in this sector. Perhaps a first.
Hard to get a handle on the business model and value points. I mean, it’s easy enough to spot, I just doubt there’s any return money in it.
I think recreational is going to kill these guys. Research might be the only thing they’re doing in a couple of years. Someone somewhere will disagree. They’re going to run out of granny’s fast. Even if there is alot of granny’s, they’re gonna be in competition with everyone to get their annual Christmas baking. ISOL - Isodiol International (in USD unless noted)
The Crystal Clear insertion has a story behind it. Shares for shares. Looks like Dad is now a chaperone.
Size of receivables a concern. As is inventory build.
Acquiring. Carlsbad and another un-named pre-stage producer. And ISO Intl. too.
Also spent $250k on ‘Pot-o-Coffee’, whatever the fuck that is.
Spent $250k on some really nice office furniture.
Page 6 of interim financials triggered my gag reflex
Since none of these outfits knows how to hedge forex exposure, I’ll offer to do it. Call me, or pm me. It’s worth the cost. I’ll sign an NDA. I was under 7 at one point, I’m trustworthy.
margin is good. consultant dependency and wages aren’t.
66% of all assets is goodwill.
There is 68 individual notes to share capital composition. Details of Page 6. I just gagged again.
50 million warrants hanging out at $0.33CAD, another 20MM options at $0.19
Capital structure looks like a teenager after meeting Freddy in ‘Nightmare on Elm Street’
Ok. They’ve got assets, revenues, and margin. They’ve also got a shit ton of balance sheet leverage. Capital structure is detailed, but without a super-computer and Stephen Hawking sitting beside me, it’s hard to get a handle. Good apparent disclosure, but simply shifts onus of risk onto reader to unwind. There’s a business in here underneath all of the shit. They also have excellent ‘pot-in-coffee’ and really (really) nice furniture. Whether the business can pay for it all, I can’t tell. Needlessly busy in financials. IMH - Invictus MD
Best defined as ‘conglomerate’
Backed off non-core revenues despite hit to margin. Given attendant G&A expansion, not surprising
Intangibles 50% of assets
profitable in front of store, marketing expense killing them. Sales force needs to pay for itself soon. Expense accounts are way too big relative to output
G&A is a car with no brakes
Dumped $12MM this year, excluding acquisitions. Hope it was all on build, hard to tell
Buying servers and trimming equipment
Puked $46MM onto balance sheet as ACMPR ‘license’ cost. Ugh. ‘Intangibles’ my ass.
New CFO isn’t a good negotiator
Optionality understated in capital structure. Disingenuous on face. Long dated, buckets of money hiding in here. Needlessly clever.
That said, decent disclosure on many parts. Why wrap a gift in saran wrap? More going on.
A brusque 17 pages. This one could use more time. Decent underlying business - while speculative - it has real assets. Capital structure has some plug ins and a few moving parts that beg questions. All a quick scan did was increase curiosity. If the elves had time, they’d want to look at the frame on this one and check for corrosion. Theres alot not said here. MDM - Marapharm Ventures
Nice sales pitch in investor deck..tried and true, but unoriginal
Balance sheet okay, assets/liabs fine. Lots of junk in the trunk
Was good until changes in shareholders equity
How exactly does ‘investor relations’ expenses comprise 30% of a company’s losses in a fiscal year?
Had to wait until page 6 to find out that working capital is “not sufficient to meet its operating, administrative costs, acquisitions and other commitment(s)”
Needs money. Bad. Like ‘EAT needs money’ bad.
If you can figure out Note 13, you’re very good. Please send me a pm explaining it.
Management is modest in cash withdrawals
No clue what they’re doing in the Canadian division, virtually all revenue exposure to - US market but massive expense attribution from up North. Groundbreaking.
There shouldn’t have been a page 30 that calculates prior period adjustments. A million point two. Yet, there it is. On page 30.
Chambering shells on assets, but high risk of a rimfire at this point.
Veritas feels like a money pit
Way too much going on in the ass end of this one. US exposure is one thing, growing and selling dope is alot simpler than this is though. A 31 page effort. Industry average ffs. These guys though have potential to be at 70 pages. Get a straight answer if you can. ATT - Abattis Biocuetical Corp.
Hard to get past the news releases on Sedar. My pdf viewer wont let me view ‘Report of exempt distribution excluding Schedule 1 of 45-106F1’ - whatever that is
June 2017 last date found for filings. Any updated info is somewhat desired and semi-willingly accepted.
Company lost 5x as much money than a year ago
When ‘Accounting & Audit Fees” are the second line on your income statement….at $88,904 and the first line on income statement of revenue, is….$54.00.…you’ve got issues
Another line of expenses is $1.2MM of management fees. One might deem this material.
So does the $2.067MM loss recorded for the period.
“These factors indicate the presence of a material uncertainty that may cast significant doubt on the ability of the Company to continue” Yep. I’ll go with that.
Thank god the company has positioned itself to be a ‘leading service provider’. If they didn’t have ‘integrated solutions’ at the ready, I’d be suspect about it’s future.
I’m out. Please call “Robert Abenante“ for more information.
This dog don’t hunt. That said, I can’t attest to it being a ‘dog’, or that it even knows what ‘hunt’ even means. Who the fuck suggested this one? Why did I listen? All I have now is unruly elves, sadist. I hope you are proud. And now, we’re short 5 companies to complete the Dive Bar Pub Crawl before Christmas. Please, if you are reading this, send help. The elves need 5 more stocks. Anything but ICC - Luis Suárez has already tipped then off, they’re on it.
I'm doing a tribute to the 24 days of Christmas by going over the financial statements of 24 companies that are considered downrange, speculative, and just plain high risk. Our first six stops is fondly captured here. All opinions are my own, and certainly not a recommendation for or against any of them, or to buy or sell. Many are companies I've never looked at before. In some cases, I'd never even heard of them. I limited myself to 45mins to each, and kept mainly to most recent financial statements and MD&A's. You'll likely know more about the company than me if you're following them. This is only my reactions with a brief commentary about what I saw in the financial statements. LDS - Lifestyle Delivery Systems
Capital structure tastes like a 4 week old egg left on a counter. Not dissimilar within this peer set.
No fx hedging. Given forex losses equalled their gross margin…..well…..seriously. Think about that.
Good: Has revenue. Bad: Needs alot more revenue.
Relatively large spend on R&D
Cash flows to exec high relative to earnings
Capital cost is relative to peers. Still means expensive, but this seems around what it is at this stage of legal cannabis.
Curious that they front loaded share price volatility in option valuation. Haven’t seen that before. Good disclosure overall. I don’t like the sliding scale at all, but it’s not material
8.3MM long dated options - large potential trip wire in mid 2019. Most cash that can be has been wrung out
Warrants are a different story. 2018 is a big hill.
Thing feels a like an ATM for management to me. RTI - Radient Technologies
Cash poor, was able to get out of hock by paying in shares.
Issued more shares through November - crazy cheap to buyer. Large discount.
Warrants issued and outstanding very large.
Same with stock options
If their sales don’t take off soon, I put these guys at extreme risk.
They need 10x the revenue they have per month, like, next week.
More financing possible I guess. The market is paying $1.30 higher than what they’re selling shares for tho. Blech.
Of all I’ve looked at, I think this business model could work if they can wait until it actually generates revenue. Top heavy balance sheet needs concrete supports quick. TNY - Tinley Beverage Company
Why in the fuck is none of these outfits able to hedge forex exposure? Not one.
Same hideously expensive capital structure as others (note 8 & 9). Apr2018 important milestone.
Still intending and still developing. Still.
At least they had the cash to open a savings account
Note 10 - complicated. Really complicated.
Thank god, one of the shorter financials.
All sparkles and rainbows and hope. The only question is if there will be anyone who wants to buy what they make. Feedstock not well defined. Scalability a real concern. Suspect they’ll need a shit ton of money if they actually try to. Feels like campers. IMH - Invictus EDIT - Dec21 1100hrs Elves pulled a boner, covered wrong financial statements. Will be corrected after they come to later today. Replaced for now by...... iAn - Ianthus Capital Holdings
Structured financiers and bankers trying to make money off of cannabis.
Lots of contingencies nested in assets, from operations to regulatory. Risk hard to pin down and multi-faceted.
These guy’s hands haven’t touched dirt in their lives.
Cash burn is high, there are some assets being loaded, but strikes me as somewhat schizophrenic, seems constrained by what’s for sale rather than creating them.
Good disclosure on capital and optionality exposure. Not terribly impressed since that’s what these guys do for a living anyway
Related party transactions abound.
Despite decent reporting (a merciful 28 pages), it explains absolutely nothing to a business person. There’s a financial analyst out there somewhere that is drooling with their structuring.
I’d remind that analyst they’ve lost $7MM this year with another quarter to go.
Most complex financials of all so far that say the least.
A business built on excel spreadsheets by bankers for bankers. So many contingencies to revenue combined with jurisdictional uncertainty, this is simply a hedge fund. Short and mid-term operational exposure is extreme. CHV - Canada House Wellness Group Inc
Balance sheet is printed on rice paper, you can see through it if you hold it up to the light
Expenses are a cluster-fuck
I am getting a callous from reading auditor notes that include: “material uncertainties cast significant doubt about their ability to continue”. Many of these companies have it on page 1.
None of these outfits should need 30 pages of financial statements. This one has 45.
Clean disclosure on forex risk. Wish others did it. CHV does it, but on an amount that probably matches their spend on postage stamps for a decade. Immaterial.
Real problems in AP & AR. Heading for a wall.
Capital structure…..sigh. Not atypical, but this company is a great example of how capital costs impair a business. A case study for business students. Notes 2, 14, 15, and 16 should be required reading in business school.
I’m going to stop, because there’s many more to go, and there’s not much more to see here in terms of doing a high level look. This has been my favorite to do so far, because their disclosure is so good. I really like the idea of a focused, vertically integrated company too, but this company is a train wreck on paper. Whether this one can survive for another year…. EDIT UPDATE! Day after I posted this, CHV announced a $7MM convertible raise, spending 25% of it on paying debt and accounts payable. Expensive, and suggests ops aren't paying the bills. Not atypical in growth phases. Exceptionally good disclosure though. Of note, 60% of the stock is owned by only 2 investors and insiders. LIB - Liberty Leaf Holdings
One saves money on accounting costs if you don’t have any revenue to record and report.
If you need to call IR, the same guy is also the CEO and corporate secretary. Saves file size in your contacts list. Feels like a squatteopportunist though, not ops/business guy. Modest salary. Might be built as a pure flip.
Built in a $250k cash (not stock) payout for himself when he walks out the door.
Burnt $70k on a US folly for supply.
Note 12 on capital structure - similar rabbit warren to these others.
Accelerated capital structure - unlike long dates, balance sheet funding is largely compressed into 2018. This means they’d better get a licence, they’d better have production/inventory ready to go, and begin operating fast, channel ready.
Given they look only like a desk and a computer atm, significant operational risk over next 9 months.
Doesn’t look bad on paper. I’d gauge the risk on whether or not production can come in on time, what the facility actually looks like, and if they can get product sold mucho pronto. CEO has no history of anything connected to cannabis, only equity structures. Despite financial ‘health’, high risk Dive Bar goodness. Speculative is an understatement for this one. If IR can specifically address those three top things accurately, it offers focused regional cannabis exposure. Problem with that is the supply bubble potential in BC though. If they were in Manitoba….
I was reading the foam board tutorial and the forex /plastic card part looks really cool and I would like to incorporate some of these techniques into builds. However, I can't find "forex" as a product, is it the same as the pvc sheets you can buy at home depot? Also, what material are the plastic cards? Thanks!
I thought it a good time to revisit ACB's prior convertible debt issue, in lieu of their share price advances and further convertible dumps. For background, at the bottom is a post I did in June 2017 that pulled their debt apart, and tried to make some sense of it. This is what ACB has done since. There's millions more outstanding, I'll consolidate and update at some point. They'd triggered an earlier tranche debentures at trigger of some $25MM, squashing that bug earlier this month. They'll be booking a $2MM charge against income in Q2-2018 for this. As well, given share price of today, the accelerated 17MM tranche @ $3 will be executed in December. While it's cash proceeds of some $50MM, they'll be taking a charge against income of $90MM for it in Q2-2018 as well. Yeah, convertibles can become very expensive money. One view would be that ACB is doing it now, because it's just gonna become waaay more expensive later on. And, they can deploy that $50MM to build hard assets. If shares soar, it'll be seen as having been prudent. One way or the other, they've just paid $1.75 for a dollar, 50 million times. There's more issues as well: 1.9MM 5yr @ $2.76, 1MM 5yr @ $2.39, and.........drum roll... 150MM of 3yr options and warrants for $75MM cash, priced at $3 & $4 respectively in Q1 2018. I'm gonna need some time and a quantum computer to hash this out. On the face of it, this all makes the phrase 'holy shit' seem a quiet understatement. Ima gonna do a long haul on this and post it - mainly because the totality of it is so massive relative to the company. Stay tuned... ***Deconstructing Convertible Debentures - or - How to Quietly Shift Massive Costs onto Shareholders**** - June 2017 I've made references to this before, but, I think a 'Dick and Jane' primer on the subject should be done. Despite the big words in the title, this stuff is really straightforward, and the math is grade 9 level. It's all about financing. That is, it's just like you going to the bank for a mortgage or a car loan. You need money you don't have to buy the shit you'd like. So. You're likely not gonna issue debentures for that Maserati (or that creamy lil' Ford Focus you simply have to have), but you will need to pledge some capital or use your credit worthiness to get financing. Businesses do the same thing. There's just more ways for them to do it. I'm not gonna go into them all - innovation in credit and credit-related derivatives is holy-fuck level complex. Fortunately, we don't need to go anywhere near that heady stuff (google 'interest rate call swaption' if you've got a finance fetish. Or maybe you're an applied mathematician/financial engineer temporally hedging your long dated forex book at a macro level). Some complexity does play a role here though, but awareness is all that's needed. First - Definitions:
Letter of Credit - cash deposit placed in trust on behalf of a company. Can be 100% (or less) depending on the industry. Sort of like a deposit.
Commercial Paper (CP) - short term financing, usually <1yr duration. Typically linked to cash, A/R, or some other liquid asset. Usually cheap, because it's tied to an asset.
Bonds - Long term financing, usually tied to specific long term assets. A power company might issue bonds and link a specific generating station to them. Or a manufacturer might pledge property plant and equipment. Think 10 years or more.
Debentures - can be short or long term, but, there is no specific asset pledged in case of default. Being riskier for lenders, it's usually an expensive way for a company to get financing. Businesses in this category may not have much (or any) assets, but they might hold a patent, or the lenders think they have a great idea.
Debt Covenants - obligations within the contract that specify behavior of the signees. An example of this might be that the borrower can't issue more debt to pay interest costs.
Second - Options Options are a derivative that is comprised of two values: intrinsic and extrinsic. Third - What's a convertible debenture? It's debt taken by a company, and given to a lender. It's simply a promise to pay. The lender asks for interest to be paid on the money lent (like CP or bonds), usually at rates higher than a secured loan. Sometimes the companies can't afford the interest rates. So, they get creative to entice lenders. One way is to offer nested options around either the company or perhaps future cash flows. Aurora (ACB) recently issued some convertible debentures to finance the Sky expansion. Cool. CMED issued some a year and a bit ago. Ok. Let's look at ACB's in detail, and find out what it cost them to get financing. I'm only gonna do a napkin calc. I could do the deep one, but, I don't want to spend 2 hours to get called names by the non-contributing lost stockhouse vagrants in here. Honestly, you can do the math too. And I'll point out where the complex is, so you'll know what you don't know. Knowing what you don't know is really useful in life. And business. I've seen a bunch in online boards say how great that 7% interest rate ACB got on the $75 million. Is that the actual cost of the money? No. It's not. They're paying a whole lot more than that. And if you're a shareholder, you should be really fucking pissed. I would be. I've never held them, or if I did, it was some short term swing trading last fall. If I can't remember, it wasn't much to remember. Fourth - ACB's Convertible Debenture Issue The $75 million lent is repayable on May 2, 2019. 7% interest, payable semi annually (June, Dec). I'm gonna ignore compounding, and do a straight calc. Materially, it won't matter. The debentures also have a call option nested in them. They also have a put option in them. Both of those options have value. Both extrinsic and intrinsic. So, the lender is not only getting interest on the cash, they're also getting free options from ACB. This was likely needed to sweeten the deal enough for them to do it. There are models out there that value options. They hold up really well. Mathematical laws and all. Simplicity and elegance. Fifth - Total Financing Cost Annually, ACB is paying $5.25MM to service the debt. Total interest cost before they have to repay the principal is $10.5MM. Right? What about that option value they gave up? ACB could've sold warrants/options, and used the premium received as financing too. Instead, they gave to to the financiers. What did they give? Using a $2.20 market price for ACB (today's, not May second), 2 years duration, 100% vol, the call option is $0.96. The put option is $3.20. So, effectively a call option on ~= 20 million shares, and a put on some ~= 15 million shares - assuming full strike on the $75 million. If ACB had written options themselves and sold them, they could have collected the dough, issued contingent treasury shares as a reserve on the balance sheet, and kept the premiums as recompense. I mentioned that there is some complexity in this. The hair on this is in the continuous conversion of the options (open to exercise at any time subject to 30 days notice - also known a a 'European' option, rather than an 'American' option). It's also got debt covenants within the debentures that prohibit ACB from further dilution (this is a failsafe for the lender, in case ACB decides to crash the stock by issuing another billion shares). And - the lender keeps their downside intact (recall, if ACB goes tits up, they've got no asset to grab), the lender will short an equivalent $75million in stock. They'll take the money, and invest it in short term money markets while waiting, topping up their 7% nominal interest. It's called a credit box. Despite it being a debenture, the lender is effectively fully securitized. So, how much did that $75 million cost them? Well, it's all there. I encourage you to look at this and work through it. I hope you have questions. The CFO at Aurora will have the answers. TLDR: Aurora is paying more than 37% in effective interest rates on their May 2 debenture issue. EDIT - a couple of more links inserted and a clean up of my shitty writing. EDIT 2 - at the bottom of this all is the impact on shareholders. What I assume is the obvious - I never did actually state. If the lender exercises, ACB will have to book a loss on their income statement for the difference between the strike of the call, and market. Potentially, it could be lots. If ACB hit $5 before May 2019, they'll take a $50MM hit to income. Probably wiping out a half year (or more) in sales. That's really the bottom of this all. Just fyi.
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Hello all! I'm a 23 year old male who has been in the workforce since HS, most of that time being in my father's convenience store so little to nothing to show for that. I've known that I want to branch into the territory of self-management and self-reliance for quite some time now but I'm stuck in a bit of a rut. I currently work for a temp agency as a shipping clerk for a 3PL. The pay definitely isn't bad for my age/position/experience (~$15/40hrs), but I find, regardless of anything, I kinda dread going into work everyday. I usually find this irritability to fade by the time I've been there for a few hours, but it's def. not something I look forward to in the mornings. That and my hours usually mean I'm getting off in the dead of the night; a lifestyle that I've lived for quite some time and am not at all a fan of. I find it to be really bad for social life, general sleep pattern, and overall sense of wellbeing. The other shipping clerks aren't really in a position to work these hours with their schedules. For a long time now, I've been reading up on plenty of PF material; investing, business building, and the like. Especially trading. I've adjusted my PF habits a lot. Whereas I used to get $1.6k untaxed from pops' store and spend nearly all of it, now I save nearly everything I can. I have a Wealthfront account that I deposit a few hundred into every month. I'll soon get my 401k and, potentially, a Roth IRA. Have an excel sheet I update with all expenses and capital. It's been a big improvement, at the least, to me. I have very few expenses (live with rents) and only really tend to spend on eating out (which I'm curbing bit by bit with mealprep), gas, and necessities such as toothpaste/shampoo/deodorant/etc. What I want to ask is, should I utilize a networking/job searching course I have that retails for a few k, or should I continue to study and slowly branch out into trading? FOREX is what I'd like to do and I study it very, very much. I don't want to dive into trading trading until I feel like I have a really solid base level by which to leap from. The general concepts of chart analysis and risk management are very appealing to me, but I don't know if I should really use that as a rationale by which to dive into such a new and foreign system. What are your thoughts? Am I better off sticking with and riding out my position? Despite my nearly every never-being-on-time issue (which I'm no longer going to let happen), my supervisor has noticed my general speed (i.e. hoards of Windows shortcuts) and novice PC expertise to locate things within our IMS and find information for truck loads. When we get heavy loads from a big account, I update the manager of the facility via email with entry/exit times, etc. - He sent me a personal email (on work email) telling me that he's happy to have a mind as sharp as mine and is always open to direct communication about ways to improve efficiency. That gets me excited and makes me want to dive 200% into learning everything about this business and seeing where I can offer suggestion; but I'm still technically a temp, not even part of the company.
Overview of Current Market Valuations and Toyota Motors (TM)
Hello All, Every now and then I do stock screens to see if there are any companies that would be a good value investment. Thanks to the bull market, the opportunities have been few and far between over the last year or two. However one company has consistently popped up in my screens. I initially ignored it as the company is in a sector I personally don't like to invest in due to the large capital requirements. The company is Toyota Motors (TM). Simply put, the valuation seems too good to be true. First off, let me show you what I am talking about. Here are the heat maps from FinViz:
Now as you can see, the general trend of the market is giving you discounts to Financials, Utilities, and Basic Materials, more specifically oil and gold. Of those sectors, I really only like Financials as big oil has been in a downward trend over the past three years. Both Exxon and Chevron have produced less oil than the previous years and are both spending at near record high CapEx levels with no turnaround yet. I have continuously looked at both of them as I don't have any oil in my current portfolio, but haven't got myself to buy either of them. Financials will continue to be attractive at these levels as investors still don't trust their book values since the financial crisis even though asset quality has continued to improve on a broad base. Over the next 5 years, interest rates will rise which will increase their spread which in turn increases their profitability. For the most part, it appears healthcare, consumer goods, and services are currently overvalued. Now, let's look at Toyota. Below is a quick multiples valuation against TM's peers. These are from Yahoo! Finance as GM isn't on FinViz for some reason. P/E
Toyota Motor Co. (TM): 7.81
Honda Motor Co. (HMC): 10.87
General Motors Co. (GM): 15.11
Ford Motor Co. (F): 8.65
Toyota Motor Co. (TM): 9.11
Honda Motor Co. (HMC): 9.30
General Motors Co. (GM): 7.35
Ford Motor Co. (F): 7.90
Toyota Motor Co. (TM): 0.29(!)
Honda Motor Co. (HMC): 0.37
General Motors Co. (GM): 0.52
Ford Motor Co. (F): 0.97
Toyota Motor Co. (TM): 1.02
Honda Motor Co. (HMC): 0.91
General Motors Co. (GM): 1.34
Ford Motor Co. (F): 2.91
As you can see, the whole sector looks cheap on a multiples basis, but of that bunch Toyota seems to win out on an overall valuation based on multiples. Per my own investing rules, as I am a long term shareholder, I won't touch a company that has recently been bankrupt, therefore I rule out GM for any potential investments. Now Toyota is too big of a company to do a full report on in a couple of days. However, of what little research I have done, this is what I have found. First of all, on a macro perspective, the yen has weakened against both the US Dollar and the Chinese Yuan. Over the past two years, the Dollar and Yuan have both gained over 30% to the yen and over 10% this past year. This is a great thing for a Japanese multinational as North America and Asia is TM's second and third largest markets which combined are 46% of 2013's sales.
Because of this, profitability should be higher within Toyota which is also a reason to buy them over GM or Ford as the american automakers will lose money with a strong dollar overseas. Over the past three years, TM has a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 5.12%. Last year, North America saw 32.8% sales growth and Asia saw 30.22% sales growth. This compounded with the yen weakening is a one-two punch. Due to the strong demand in both North America and Asia, Toyota has had a surge in Consolidated Net Income for Fiscal Year 2014 of 135% in which ForEx is responsible for 123% of that growth alone. In this latest quarter, Net Revenues are up 23.9% with Net Income up 118%. Toyota's Shareholder Presentation Margins have increased across the board with their Gross Profit increasing from last year: TM's Gross Profit Margin
As for a quick look at the balance sheet, Toyota has been de-leveraging over the past 5 years with Total Debt / Equity of 1.25 in 2009 to 1.16 in 2013. Book Value per Share has stayed relatively flat but grew 15.14% from 2012 to 2013. Compare that to a one year increase in share price of only 12.25% I believe we have a winner. This is only what I have found off of a couple hours looking at this tonight and have only scratched the surface as to the information on this company. However after just a small amount of research I firmly believe this is a truly undervalued company and should be bought right away. References: Quick Stats pulled from TM's Annual Report EDIT Thank you all for the replies. I should state that this is just beginning due diligence and there are several assumptions with this thesis, mainly that the Yen will stay depressed at least over the next year. This type of condition is a short term catalyst only and not a long term theme. As some have mentioned already, FX has been almost entirely behind TM's profit and there are real geopolitical risks between Japan and China. Next week I will put together another post looking more into the actual underlying company's long term performance and management's strategic plan going forward. That way we can get a glimpse of what the company might look like in the future. Again thank you all for the kind words and the intelligent discussion around this topic.
Technical data sheet for FOREX ®classic FOREX ®classic is a white, slightly expanded closed-cell rigid PVC sheet material with a particu-larly fine and homogeneous cell structure and silky matt surfaces. Product characteristics 1 – 3 mm 4 – 19 mm Apparent density (nominal) DIN EN ISO 1183-1 kg/m 3 700 500 Alibaba.com offers 1,594 forex sheet products. About 42% of these are Plastic Sheets. A wide variety of forex sheet options are available to you, such as material, processing service. FOREX ® - creative sheet material. The FOREX ® range of fine, white, rigid PVC foam sheets offers options for printing and three-dimensional forming. The brilliant white, smooth and even surface ensures optimum ink adhesion and colour fastness. Light and high quality with good dimensional stability and B1 fire rating, FOREX ® is ideal for short-term indoor and outdoor applications, such as ... China Pvc Forex Sheet manufacturers - Select 2020 high quality Pvc Forex Sheet products in best price from certified Chinese Plastic Sheet manufacturers, Foam PVC suppliers, wholesalers and factory on Made-in-China.com Forex® is one of the most renowned producers of Polyvinylchloride (PVC) sheet material. Our Forex® boards are foamed PVC sheets, also known as Foamex. The sheets have a dense, hard top layer and a foamed core. This makes foamed PVC just as sturdy as Solid PVC at only half the weight. Forex® boards are an ideal material for any do-it-yourselver. The sheets are easy to handle and lend ... FOREX®print sheet material is specially designed to meet the requirements in the field of printing. The extremely lightweight sheet is outstanding due to its brilliant white, smooth, even surface which forms the basis for a perfect printing result, particularly for direct digital printing. Due to its surface structure, FOREX®print attains optimum ink adhesion for printing and is extremely ... 5mm Forex Classic White Foam PVC Sheet; Forex Classic is the No. 1 sheet in the Forex product family having the best mechanical properties and a top-grade surface quality with a high density and improved rigidity; Forex Classic sheets can be fabricated mechanically without any problem and can also be thermoformed for 3-dimensional applications ; Fine, close homoeneous cell structure; Smooth ...
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This move will show you how to prepare and paint PVC board. PVC Board can be known under many trade marked names such as Foamex, Forex, Palight and there are... Foamex PVC is one of the most simple plastics to work with, as unlike many materials it can be easily cut with a knife and safely drilled without splitting. ... In this video we put Foamex PVC Boards into the spotlight and take a look at what properties make them such an ideal signage material. Short for Polyvinyl Ch... ENGLISH: eurolaser and 3A Composites - specialists in the advertising industry Visual communications In collaboration with our partner 3A Composites, a world... In this video, you'll be guided step by step through the process of fitting Fortex external cladding from Freefoam, that is available in several colour optio... Fully handmade DIY vintage sports car Materials used: 1. Forex sheet 2. Feviquik 3. Fevicol Dimensions: Length : 29 cm Width : 9.8 cm (tyre to tyre) Wheel Ba... Preorder my terrain book here - Like it? Love it? Support it! - http://www.patreon.com/TheTerrainTutor Do you build terrain? First time builder? Pro? Checkou... Video introduttivo al FOREX, cos'è, dove si trova e come lo si lavora. Se vi è piaciuto il video lasciate un like e inscrivetevi al canale per seguire i miei... Sheet size 8'x4' ,8'x2' sheet price -approx 2500 to 5000rs Charcoal sheet is you can say a type of laminate but it is not exactly a laminate. It is a PVC bas...